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Social History and Taxes: The Case of Early Modern France 
Apart from a flurry of interest in tax revolts ten years ago, 
social historians of early modern Europe have by and large ignored 
taxation. Their neglect is perhaps understandable, given that social 
history itself arose as a revolt against traditional political history 
and all that it entailed, including the operations of the fisc. The 
fact that details of early modern fiscal systems often lie interred in 
tedious administrative histories or that many political historians 
themselves seem to overlook matters of interest to social historians 
of course only compounds the problem. 
Yet while the neglect social historians have shown early 
modern taxation is perhaps understandable, it is nonetheless 
unfortunate. Indeed, it is even inexcusable. Taxation obviously had 
a drastic effect on the common people of early modern Europe, an 
effect that went far beyond the seizure of hard earned coins from 
their pockets. Those who were supposed to pay taxes endeavored to 
escape the fiscal burden. and many individuals sought to manipulate or 
take advantage of the tax collection system. When the Muscovite 
govermnent imposed a household tax in the seventeenth century. for 
example, families "doubled up to cut their taxes." The result, so one 
historian claims, was the birth of the extended family in Russia. 1 In 
sixteenth-century France, taxes levied on meat and livestock sold in 
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Paris drove butchers, consumers and livestock dealers to trade in 
towns outside the capital, and Parisian students "worked their way 
through school" by placing their personal exemptions from wine taxes 
at the service of vineyard owners.2 All of these phenomena--from the 
growth of the extended family in Russia to flourishing of the cattle 
trade in towns such as Pontoise and Poissy outside of Paris and the 
fraudulent exchange of property between vintners and students~ are 
the sort of matters that interest social historians, and all of them 
are linked to taxation. And other, similar examples readily come to 
mind. By ignoring taxation, then, the social historian is not merely 
overlooking the devastating impact of fiscal levies; he is also 
blinding himself to one of the causes of noteworthy and important 
social phenomena. 
By itself, this paper can hardly right the balance after years 
of neglect. It is, in fact, merely a prospectus of work just begun, 
and it is restricted to one country-- France~and not the whole of 
early modern Europe. Still, by pointing out the the importance of 
taxation for social history and particularly for the social history of 
the countryside, I hope that I can stimulate further research on the 
connection between society. the economy and taxation. The result may 
be another analytical factor which social historians can add to their 
quiver. 
What were the taxes levied in early modern France? Answering 
this question is not as simple as it may seem, since the French crown 
relied for its revenues upon a bewildering variety of taxes and other 
fiscal expedients. Moreover, both the weight of these various taxes 
and the manner in which they were collected varied considerably 
between 1500 and 1789. For our purposes, however, it will suffice to 
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mention several major sources of revenue. To begin with, there was 
the !..!.i.!l!.• which combined features of a tax on land, on income and on 
personal property. In parts of the south of France (the areas of 
taille r6elle), the !..!.i.!l!. was levied on land only. Elsewhere, it 
applied to all assets and (though in a highly inequitable way) to most 
forms of income. The French government also collected a number of 
indirect taxes, including the aides, which were sales taxes on a 
variety of goods; the traites, which were tolls and duties levied on 
exports, imports and items passing from region to region in France; 
and the gabelle, or salt tax. In addition, the monarchy sold 
government offices and a variety of privileges. such as the right a 
guild could buy to monopolize local trade in a good. 3 
Ideally. we would like to know why the French monarchy relied 
upon this particular mix of taxes and loans and why it turned to these 
fiscal expedients rather than others. Such insight, however. does not 
yet lie at hand. Many historians. of course. would despair of ever 
achieving a satisfactory explanation of Old-Regime taxation, since the 
whole fiscal system appears (at least at first glance) to have been 
nothing more than a jerry-built monument to irrational construction. 
Nevertheless. it is possible to make some general statements about the 
way the fisc operated~statements that will help illuminate the social 
consequences of taxation. 4 In the first place, the government had a 
hard time knowing precisely what the tax base was, for measuring what 
economic resources its subjects owned was difficult and costly. 
Because information about taxable resources was so difficult to 
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procure, the government had to rely upon a variety of indirect 
indicators and rules of thumb. For example. the local tax officials 
who divided up the taille among rural parishes (the 6lus) were 
supposed to investigate local harvest yields, population figures and 
other evidence of ability to pay, such as the number of parishioners 
who had been imprisoned for nonpayment of taxes. Similarly, Louis 
XIV's Finance Minister. Colbert, sought information about the number 
of households per parish in order to assess the ~ more 
effectively. Needless to say. taxpayers withheld or misreported 
information that would affect their tax obligations. In 1661, the 
intendant who was charged with levying the taille in the g6n6ralit6 of 
Orl6ans reported that peasants hesitated to reveal the number of 
cattle they owned, since they feared that this information would be 
used to raise their taxes. The costs of such information were also 
reflected in the lower prices tax farmers paid for the right to 
collect taxes or sell government offices in little known corners of 
rural France. and even government mapmakers found that they were 
"intentionally misled" by subjects who did not want their village 
mentioned on the map "so as to avoid ••• the lodging of troops and 
the ••• taille."5 
Another problem for the monarchy was that it could scarcely 
control the officials who collected the taxes. There were undoubtedly 
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diseconomies of scale involved in monitoring officials, and in a vast 
kingdom like France which was plagued with an enormous ntDDber of 
officials. the task of keeping close track of their behavior was 
prohibitively expensive. Another means of making officials toe the 
line~paying them a salary premi'IDD so that they would fear losing 
their positions~was also apparently beyond the government's means. 6 
The result, of course, was that tax officials manipulated the tax 
system for their own benefit. Furthermore, powerful subjects sought 
to pressure the tax collectors or to acquire their own influential 
posts in the fiscal system. In the first half of the seventeenth 
century. for example, the 6lus, who imposed the taille upon individual 
parishes, gained widespread notoriety for reducing the tax in villages 
where they or their relatives owned land. Assessors within the 
villages indulged in similar favoritism, and seigniors and other 
members of the local elite all sought to reduce their own taxes and 
those of their allies. 7 
One might argue that such manipulation of t~e tax system ought 
to have subsided in the face of royal absolutism. It is true that 
over the course of the seventeenth century the royal intendants took 
over responsibility for the levying of the taille, and their efforts 
no doubt diminished the opportunity blus and local notables had to 
exploit the fiscal system. But this merely changed the focus of 
corruption: 
Before the introduction of the intendants, corruption was 
basically local; after the introduction of the intendants, 
corruption was centralized to the extent that the 
ministers~notably Sbguier and even Colbert, despite his 
reputation of incorruptibility--were solicitous for t§eir 
own estates and those of their relatives and friends. 
In short, royal absolutism merely shifted the major arena for the 
bribery, favoritism, and the search for tax exemptions toward Paris. 
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These activities, which some economists would term "rent seeking," did 
not diminish; indeed, they may well have increased. 9 
What effect did the tax system have upon French society? To 
answer this question, let us restrict our attention to the 
countryside, for the impact of taxation was heaviest there. In the 
first place, the operations of the fisc may well help explain the vast 
S'IDDS of money that flowed into land during the period from 
approximately 1550 to the early 1700s. During these years. nearly 
every region of France saw merchants, lawyers. royal officials and 
noblemen buy up land from debt-ridden peasants, either by purchasing 
the peasants' fields outright or by foreclosing on mortgages. The 
records of this great exchange of property fill page after page of 
notarial registers, and the process was common enough to have 
attracted the attention of contemporaries. In Lyon, for example, the 
local historian and minor humanist GuillatDDe Paradin described in 1573 
how the city's wealthy merchants and bankers had been buying land from 
peasants at bargain prices: 
The poor laboureurs, lacking enough to eat, were constrained 
to put their lands up for sale at rock bottom prices to rich 
people who thereby acquired good lands and vineyards for a 
morsel of bread. In this way, many have built beautiful 
f~rms and villas, f8nstructing their country houses upon the 
misery of paupers. 
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Evidence from Saint-Genis-Laval, a small market town south of 
Lyon, bears out Paradin's observations and exemplifies the process 
that Paradin had observed in the Lyonnais and that contemporaries 
noticed in other regions of France. Of course, Saint-Genis is only 
one village among many, but the example it provides is both graphic 
and well documented. 
In Saint-Genis, peasant land passed into into the hands of 
bourgeois from Lyon; these purchasers from Lyon were the sort of 
merchants and bankers whom Paradin had in mind. 11 In1388, citizens of 
Lyon owned merely 4.1~ of the land in Saint-Genis, and in 1493, they 
held only a little more, 10.4~. But their holdings increased to 33.0'lt 
by the late seventeenth century--a transfer of perhaps some 300 
hectares since 1493 (table 1). Admittedly, one wonld appreciate more 
details about urban holdings in Saint-Genis after 1518, and it is 
unfortunate that the documents we must rely upon after 1518 differ 
from those used in the earlier periods. It shonld also be noted that 
the wave of land sales in Saint-Genis was peculiar in certain 
respects. It began earlier in Saint-Genis than in other parts of 
France (a fact we will explore below), and the buyers were perhaps 
more likely to be urbanites than was the case elsewhere. In nearby 
Dauphin6, for instance, it was primarily nobles (including noble 
office holders) and ecclesiastics who bought up peasant land. 12 Still, 
the land sales and the rush to invest in land were hardly unique to 
Saint-Genis-Laval, and they were in fact symptomatic of what was 
happening throughout the country. 
Date 
1388 
1493 
1517-18 
1687 
1787 
* not available 
Table 1 
Percent of Land in Saint-Genis-Laval 
Owned by Residents of Lyon 
Hectares 
Owned 
54 
135 
200 
* 
* 
Percent of Total 
Land in Saint-Genis 
4.2 
10.5 
15.5 
33.0 
25.0 
Source: Archives Municipales de Lyon, CC 49-50; Marie Therese Lorcin, 
Les campagnes de lA region lyonnaise .!filS ~IVe et XVe siecles (Lyon, 1974), 
pp. 383, 395; Gascon, 2:818; George Durand, VJJ:!.._ vigne et vignerons ~ 
lyonnais et beaujolAis (Lyon-Paris, 1979), p. 439. 
Note: Figures for 1388, 1493. and 1517-18 were taken from Lyon tax 
records, which give the area of holdings be longing to residents of Lyon. 
For 1687 and 1787. we have to rely upon terriers, as reported in Durand. 
The terriers concern only land that was subject to the seignior--a major 
portion of the community but not all of it. Hence, acreage totals for the 
te~riers are not directly comparable to the earlier area totals. 
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Marc Bloch has called this inflmc of money into land "the most 
decisive event in French social history," and from Gaston Roupnel in 
the 1920s and Louis Merle in the 1950s to the more recent works of 
Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie and Jean Jacquart, historians have documented 
the transfer of peasant property in a number of local studies. The 
peasants• losses. it is argued, both destroyed their independence and 
helped create a united class of noble and upper bourgeois landlords. 
In addition, these privileged landlords tended to consolidate their 
holdings. and although this consolidation and the concomitant losses 
by small peasants were never carried to the extremes of the English 
enclosures. they did undeniably alter the face of French 
. 1 13 agr1cu ture. 
The connection between this wave of investment in agriculture 
and taxation is very simple. While peasant farms bore the brunt of 
increasingly heavy taxes during much of the period from 1550 to the 
end of Louis XIV's reign, the nobles and privileged urbanites who 
spent money on land generally evaded most of the taxes on their rural 
holdings. The peasant had to pay the taille, which combined features 
of a land tax and a levy on agricultural income. If he sold his 
produce in a urban market, he might also have to pay aides. But in 
most parts of France, a noble or privileged urbanite did not have to 
pay the taille on rural land he purchased, and if he did pay it. he 
usually escaped at a lower rate. Moreover. he could often sell wine 
and produce from his lands in the city where he lived without paying a 
full share of the aides. 
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In sixteenth-century Lyon. for example. if an urban merchant 
purchased a vineyard from a peasant, the vineyard would in effect be 
withdrawn from the taille rolls of the peasant's village. In theory, 
the merchant would pay a tax on this property as part of Lyon's own 
levy on real property, but his assessment would be far less than the 
portion of the .!.!.i!!J!. the peasant had originally paid. In addition, 
the merchant could bring wine from his own vineyard into Lyon without 
paying aides. Although the wine he imported was ostensibly for his 
personal use. he could no doubt sell it on the market. The peasant 
who previously owned the vineyard would of course have had to pay the 
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aides. 
Many city dwellers elsewhere in France enjoyed similar 
exemptions. despite efforts made in the seventeenth century to make 
urbanites pay the .!.!.i!!J!. on their rural holdings. and in areas of the 
taille personelle, nobles and many office holders escaped the taille 
as well.15 It might seem that the taille would fall upon any tenants 
who leased land from tax exempt owners. but the exempt were quite 
often able to spare their tenants from taxes. In seventeenth-century 
Normandy. for instance, nobles and tax exempt officers could work one 
of their farms and all their meadows without paying the taille. 
Although they were supposed to hire wage labor to do the farming. they 
could rent the land out and claim that the tenants were domestics. 
And if the taille was levied upon the tenants of a nobleman or an 
officer in Normandy, it was often levied at a lower rate. because such 
privileged landowners were usually successful in reducing their 
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tenants' assessment. The same was in fact true in many other regions 
of France. Even in areas of taille r6elle, where exemptions from the 
iaille were attached to particular pieces of land and not to 
individuals, members of the elite managed to reduce their tax burden 
by manipulating the assessment figures in the communal cadastres. 16 
Ultimately, the exemptions and the disproportionate tax burden 
drove a number of peasants out of business. Peasants fell into debt 
to pay taxes that rose precipitously in the last half of the sixteenth 
century and the first half of the 1600s and stayed high until the 
early eighteenth century. 17 They then sold out to privileged 
investors, who usually rented or sharecropped the land. These 
privileged investors~nobles, off ice holders, or tax exempt 
urbanites~were willing to purchase the land (and willing to pay more 
for it than any non-privileged buyer) because it gave them an 
opportunity to exploit their tax exemptions. As the military engineer 
and tax reformer Vauban remarked in 1707, the exemptions raised the 
value of the privileged investors' property relative to land held by 
tax paying peasants, which pres11111ably dropped in price everytime the 
taille was raised.18 
A bit of economics will clarify this whole process and explain 
why the land sales occurred when they did and why they finally came to 
a halt. In the long run, we would expect a peasant to pay for land an 
amount equal to the net revenue it brought in. For a given piece of 
land, he would pay ~ - Tp• where ~ was the (discounted) net revenue 
the peasant received from the plot of land, exclusive of taxes, and Tp 
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was the (discounted) value of the taxes he had to pay. The same would 
hold for a privileged landlord, but he would face different costs and 
much smaller taxes, if he paid taxes at all. In particular, since he 
was an absentee landlord, he bore the additional cost of overseeing 
the land and its tenants. This could involve disposing of crops from 
afar, supervising laborers, and ensuring that tenants paid their rent 
and did not abuse buildings, trees, or animals. These costs of 
supervision, which an owner-occupier such as a peasant did not have to 
pay, were of great concern to contemporaries, and they could loom 
large enough to make a distant plot of land nearly worthless for an 
absentee owner.19 
Let S(r) denote these costs of supervision, which we ass11111e to 
be an increasing function of the distance r to the landlord's 
residence, let~ denote the absentee landlord's (discounted) net 
revenue from the piece of land in question, excluding the supervision 
costs and taxes, and let TL be his tax bill (here ~ might differ from 
~ for a number of reasons~the peasant might engage more heavily in 
subsistence agriculture, for example). Then the privileged landlord 
would pay 
~ - ~ + S(r) 
for the plot of land, whereas the peasant would pay 
~ - Tp• 
If the property was in the hands of the peasant, he would sell it to 
the landlord (rather than to another peasant) provided ~ - TL + S(r) 
exceeded what the property was worth to him, or RP - Tp •20 
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Absentee landlords, in short, would buy up all land for which 
~ - "Ii. + S(r) > RP - Tp• or all land for which 
Tp - TL + ~ - ~ > S(r). 
In other words, privileged landlords would purchase land up to the 
point where the costs of administering distant estates outweighed the 
advantages of a tax exemption. Since these supervisory costs S(r) 
would increase with r, the privileged landlords would tend to buy land 
lying within a certain distance of their homes; beyond a certain 
distance, their holdings would tend to disappear. If the privileged 
landlords all lived within a city--a fairly reasonable ass'Dlllption~ 
then their holdings would therefore tend to cluster--all other things 
being equal~near the city's walls. 
Any tax increase which boosted the tax bills of peasants more 
than those of the privileged would clearly encourage the privileged to 
buy more land because it would enlarge the gap between Tp and TL. 
This would happen, for example, if taxes were increased for peasants 
alone or if privileged landlords paid taxes at a lower rate--
assU111ptions that seem realistic for the Old Regime. It is thus no 
wonder that tax increases between the sixteenth century and the early 
1700s led to transfers of land from the peasantry to the tax exempt, 
Given the structure of exemptions, the taxes peasants faced were bound 
to increase more than those levied upon the privileged, and each tax 
increase would produce further land sales until the costs of 
administering distant estates once again balanced the tax exemptions. 
The whole process would come to a halt only when taxes ceased to grow 
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or when the government limited exemptions, Unfortunately, successful 
efforts in this direction had to await the end of the reign of Louis 
XIV, when taxes leveled off and the fisc shifted toward slightly 
greater equity.21 
Although most historians ack:nOYledge that taxes made life 
difficult for the peasantry in the period from roughly 1550 to roughly 
1720, they have failed to recognize the effect that tax exemptions had 
upon investment in land. That the f isc drove peasants into debt and 
forced them to sell their fields is a fact which everyone knows; that 
the tax system gave the privileged an incentive to buy the peasant 
land, though, has not been appreciated.22 This fact would explain why 
the purchasers were by and large those who enjoyed tax exemptions: 
nobles, office holders, or privileged urbanites, They could even be 
members of the village elite, such as rural merchants or wealthy 
peasants who had managed to manipulate local tax assessments or 
purchase tax exempt offices. The hypothesis that rising taxes and 
inequitable exemptions were at least partially responsible for the 
flow of money into land also fits the chronology of the investments. 
Taxes (and tax inequities) increased considerably in the middle of the 
sixteenth century, at just the time that the money began to flow into 
land, and there was not much relief until the end of Louis XIV's 
reign, in the early eighteenth century, at about the time that 
investment in land tapered off, Furthermore, the transfer of peasant 
land seemed to peak during the periods of highest taxation~during the 
Thirty Years War, for example~when the gap between what the 
14 
privileged would pay for land and what peasants would pay undoubtedly 
widened. We can even explain the seemingly premature transfers of 
land in the market town of Saint-Genis-Laval. Privileged landlords 
from Lyon bought up plots there even before 1550, and they presumably 
engaged in these early purchases because the monarchy had in 1462 
granted citizens of Lyon a tax exemption for property they held 
throughout the Lyonnais.23 
Curiously, most of the other reasons historians have offered 
for the wave of investment in agriculture fail to explain either the 
general chronology of the land sales or the facts about the identity 
of the purchasers. In fact, most of the other explanations simply 
fall apart upon closer inspection. Often, for example, historians 
account for this transfer of property by citing the peasants' 
"misery," but real though it may have been, misery is merely a 
symptom, not a cause. We need to know precisely what it was that 
reduced the peasants to grinding poverty and forced them to sell their 
land in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Why did they 
not sell before 1550 or after 1720? 
Similarly, it is not enough to invoke the security and status 
that property ownership conferred in order to explain why French 
elites increased their purchases of land. Owning property undoubtedly 
fulfilled a variety of non-pecuniary desires, but there is no reason 
to believe that these became more pronounced after 1550 and then less 
important after 1720. Furthermore, the nobles, officers, and 
privileged bourgeois who bought farm land often seemed far more 
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concerned about profits than one might imagine. Consider, for 
example, the illustrious Gadagne family from Lyon. Enormously 
wealthy, they purchased estates in Saint-Genis-Laval and other parts 
of the Lyonnais, and they were even cited by Marc Bloch as one of 
those great banking and mercantile families who abandoned trade for 
the greater prestige and eventual ennoblement that seigniories and 
rural properties conferred. It is true that the Gadagnes bought 
seigniories and a number of chateaux. However, they also made a great 
effort to round out their agricultural holdings, as if they were 
concerned about economies of scale in administration, and they 
invested considerable money in converting grain fields to more 
profitable vineyards. And even if the Gadagnes and their peers were 
exclusively concerned about the status that seigniorial estates 
offered, the argument about taxes and investment would still hold 
true, for a tax exemption would only make a prestigious estate cost 
less and therefore render it all the more attractive. 24 
Another factor that is often cited to explain the transfer of 
property--mauvaise conioncture or unfavorable economic conditions, 
particularly during the "crisis" of the seventeenth century--seems 
equally vacuous as an explanation. If mauvaise conjoncture means 
simply reduced profits from farming, why did privileged investors 
continue to buy farms? And even if we ignore this troubling question, 
it is not all clear that returns from agriculture did fall. 
Agricultural lease rates, which provide a good index of the expected 
profits to be derived from farming, actually rose in most parts of 
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France in the last half of the sixteenth century and in the early 
seventeenth century. at a time when enormous quantities of land were 
changing hands. 25 Profits did decline during the crisis years later in 
the seventeenth century, but we are still left with the task of 
explaining all the property transfers that had already taken place. 
If, on the other hand, mauvaise conjoncture means simply an 
abnormal succession of crop failures. then we must somehow demonstrate 
that the fluctuations of agricultural revenues were greater between 
lSSO and 1720 than in other years. Although it would be possible to 
do this (one could imagine a world in which a higher variation in 
agricultural revenues favored large investors who could spread risks 
more effectively. and one could test for a higher variance of revenues 
using tithe or lease records), no one has yet formulated the necessary 
model. And in any case. it seems highly unlikely that revenues would 
vary more than normally for over one hundred and fifty years. 26 
A related explanation for the flow of money into land involves 
population growth and diminishing returns in agriculture. Fmmanuel Le 
Roy Ladurie and others have argued that increases in population 
fragmented peasant holdings and reduced many farms to such an extent 
that they were no longer profitable.27 Left with a pitiful existence 
on a tiny scrap of land, many a peasant was forced to sell. The 
problem with this argument, though. is that in most areas of France 
population growth ceased in the first half of the seventeenth century. 
With a stagnant or declining population. one would presume that the 
size of farms would stabilize and that peasants would no longer have 
any reason to sell. But as we know the sales of land continued for 
well over fifty years. 28 
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Moreover, this whole line of reasoning neglects a number of 
strategies which peasants could and did adopt in times of population 
growth. In the countryside around Lyon, for example, peasants sought 
work in the city when the population was rising. They also married 
later, which limited the size of their families and brought 
fragmentation to a halt. Furthermore. they could~and did~shift to 
labor-intensive cultivation. such as viticulture, and thus circumvent 
some of the problems of diminishing returns. Since the labor 
intensive crops seem to have permitted a profit even on small plots of 
land, it is not at all clear that population growth and estate 
fragmentation (even when they occurred) would have forced peasants to 
sel1. 29 Finally. even if population growth sheds light on some of the 
land sales. it does not explain why nobles. officers, urban merchants 
and other privileged investors predominated among the buyers. After 
all. the market for land in France was fairly well developed, and 
peasants could have traded among themselves to avoid the evils of 
excessive fragmentation. Yet it was outsiders~the nobles, merchants 
and officers~who made the overwhelming majority of the purchases. 30 
This is not to say that the inequities of the tax system were 
the only cause of the great transfer of agricultural land in early 
modern France. Population increase might have played a partial role, 
at least for the sales before the mid-seventeenth century, and there 
may be some merit to Marc Bloch's assertion that the peasants sold 
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their land because they (unlike nobles officers. and other privileged 
individuals) lacked cash. According to Bloch, rising royal taxes 
forced peasants to come up with hard currency to pay their taxes. but 
without any reasonable source of credit. the peasants simply had to 
pawn their fields. Bloch's argument presumes. of course. that credit 
markets were imperfect. and that the only credit available came from 
monopolistic lenders. Most historians would probably agree with this 
assumption, but it really deserves further investigation. Given the 
risks of agricultural lending. it is not enough merely to cite 
evidence of high interest rates in order to conclude that moneylenders 
were monopolistic usurers. We have to see how many lenders there were 
and what alternative sources of credit were available. In Saint-
Genis-Laval. for example. many peasants themselves engaged in money 
lending, and it is therefore difficult to trace the loss of peasant 
land in Saint-Genis back to monopolistic credit markets. 31 
In any case. taxes and tax exemptions do seem to have spurred 
purchases of land in early modern France. One would. of course. like 
additional evidence~in particular. further proof that the buyers and 
their tenants were tax exempt. and more details about the chronology 
of the land sales. Verifying some of the further implications of our 
hypothesis about taxes also deserves attention. In the areas where 
the privileged could exploit tax exemptions. for example. the price of 
land should have remained relatively insensitive to increases in 
taxes. for when taxes rose, the amonnt that the privileged would pay 
for land should have declined only slightly. if at all (the decline 
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should Ln fact equal the change in TL' which could be zero). In other 
areas, by contrast, the price of land should have dropped 
considerably--namely, by an amount equal to the change in Tp--whenever 
taxes increased. 
There is, though, one additional piece of evidence that 
bolsters our argument: taille rolls from Venissieux, a village south 
of Lyon and across the river Rhone from Saint-Genis-Laval. Although 
Venissieux was no further from Lyon than ~aint-Genis, privileged 
investors from Lyon behaved differently in Venissieux than they did in 
Saint-Genis, and the only way to explain the contrast between the two 
communities is to invoke differences between the local tax systems. 
Venissieux, it turns out, lay just over the border of Dauphine, and in 
Dauphine tax exemptions worked differently than they did in Saint-
Genis, at least as far as absentee landlords from Lyon were concerned. 
Although tax exemptions for nobles, office holders and other 
privileged individuals existed Ln Dauphine (exemptions there provoked 
a long legal battle in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries), 
citizens of Lyon did not enjoy such firm immunities for the property 
they owned in the province. In 1545, Lt is true, the monarchy did 
exempt residents of Lyon from the taille for land they owned in 
Dauphine, and like other local urbanites they undoubtedly possessed 
similar exemptions earlier in the century as well. But as early as 
1543 residents of villages such as Venissieux placed landlords from 
Lyon on the taille rolls for their local holdings, and while the royal 
exemption undoubtedly kept the villagers from collecting the taxes 
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they had assessed in 1543-44. the same was not true thereafter. By 
the 1550s. in fact. villages in Dauphin6 had successfully begun to tax 
the holdings of non-noble urban landlords. and by the 1640s. after a 
long court battle. they had moved toward a more equitable tax system. 
which allowed even nobles to be taxed. 32 
The details of this court battle need not concern us; for our 
purposes. all we need to know is that the residents of Lyon lost their 
exemption for property in Dauphin6 in general and in V6nissieux in 
particular. This was probably the case by the end of the sixteenth 
century. and it was certainly so by the 1640s. If our argument abont 
taxes is correct. the loss of this exemption ought to have affected 
residents of Lyon who held property in V6nissieux. They should have 
sold their plots once they had to start paying taxes. and the 
proportion of land held by the Lyonnais should have declined. Other 
investors~nobles. for example~might have continued to invest in 
V6nissieux. but the Lyonnais would have given up the ghost. 
This is precisely what happened. if we can believe the taille 
figures. which suggest that absentee landlords from Lyon owned less 
property in V6nissieux in 1661 than in 1543-44 (table 2). One 
hesitates. of course. to translate taille figures directly into 
landholding figures. for elites could manipulate assessments. The 
Lyonnais. however. lacked the tools to engage in such trickery in 
Dauphin6 (if anything. they were likely to be overassessed). and in 
any event they were probably less able to influence the taille rolls 
as time went on. In all likelihood. then. the taille rolls from 
Date 
1543-44 
1598-99 
1661 
Table 2 
Percent of the Taille Assessed to 
Residents of Lyou in 
Venissieux 
Percent 
37% 
38%* 
10% 
* Figure iucludes percent of taille assessed to residents of Lyon 
and all other taille-paying absentee landlords. The percent of 
the taille paid by landlords from Lyon is therefore less (and 
perhaps considerably less) than the 38% figure. 
Source: ADR, E supplement. fonds des communes, Venissieux, taille rolls. 
Note: For 1598-99, three taille rolls were averaged together. For 
1661, the area of Feysin was excluded. 
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V~nissieu.x probably understate the decline in property ownership by 
the Lyonnais. And what a contrast with Saint-Genis-Laval just across 
the river, where the Lyonnais were buying up more and more land! 
Clearly, it would be hard to explain this stark difference except by 
invoking our argument about tax exemptions. 
If tax exemptions explain both the contrast between these two 
communities and the great transfer of peasant property, then they also 
shed light on the growing stratification in peasant communities that 
has figured prominently in a number of recent social histories. The 
sort of individuals who rose in the peasant communities were, in the 
first place, the ones who had the skills to fa:cm or even manage 
estates for the growing number of absentee landlords. They had the 
assets, reputation, and experience needed to be an absentee landlord's 
agent or fermier; the close relationship they enjoyed with influential 
landlords might bring them lower tax assessments as well. If they 
were literate, they might also purchase a minor tax exempt offices. 
Most important of all, they usually had a stranglehold over village 
and seigniorial offices, which allowed them manipulate tax assessments 
and other village affairs in their own favor. The result, of course, 
was that these wealthy peasants--the cogs du village, marchands-
laboureurs, or fermiers-receveurs~profited in many ways, and in 
particular they usually paid lower taxes. It is no wonder then that 
they themselves acquired fa:cm land and rose in the village, while most 
other peasants lost their property and fell. 33 
The royal government was no doubt concerned about the sale of 
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peasant land, for this transfer of property into the hands of tax 
exempt purchasers eroded the government's tax base. In the 
seventeenth century, the monarchy therefore made an effort to limit 
tax exemptions, and although the king often spoke of these tax reforms 
as a means of protecting the poor, the desire to boost tax revenues 
always lay somewhere near the surface. One example of the monarchy's 
efforts was its investigation of titles of nobility--an investigation 
undertaken (at least in part) in order to reduce false claims to 
fiscal exemptions by virtue of noble status. The crown also struggled 
against exemptions and low tax assessments for officers, city 
dwellers, and village elites.34 None of these measures was perfectly 
successful, although they probably did limit access to future tax 
exemptions and thereby raised the value of the exemptions already in 
existence. 
The crown also took direct measures to stem the sale of some 
peasant land. Actually limiting sales by individual peasants was no 
doubt beyond the government's means. Indeed, no one appears to have 
contemplated this alternative, which in any case would have been 
prohibitively expensive to enforce. But the government did place 
restrictions upon the sale of the land and property rights belonging 
to villages~restrictions that were no doubt easier to monitor. 
Typically, villages in France owned communal property, such as 
meadows, forests, or waste lands; they also possessed communal rights 
to graze animals or collect wood. The villages relied upon income 
from leasing out this communal property to defray community expenses, 
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which could include such things as rebuilding tho parish church. 
repairing ditches and fountains. paying for lawyers and court costs. 
or lodging govermnent soldiers. Or they might pledge it as collateral 
when they had particularly largo bills to pay. 
In any case. tho revenue from tho communal property (or tho 
loans obtained by pledging it as collateral) fed directly into tho 
village budget. and any expenses for local repairs that exceeded this 
communal property revenue had to be met by adding a surtax to tho 
taille. If a village possessed substantial quantities of communal 
property. it did not have to pile its own taxes on top of the king's 
!.!i!.!§.. but if it had sold its communal holdings. then its own 
impositions would increase and compete with tho demands of the royal 
fisc. Tho result of any sale of communal land would thus be to reduce 
what the fisc could extract from tho village. Tho problem for tho 
monarchy. though. was that villages had an incentive to sell communal 
property in times of high royal taxes. because tho villages' own 
budgets would be squeezed and because they could get a high price for 
communal property from tax exempt buyers. But when tho communal land 
was turned over to buyers who were tax exempt (as was invariably the 
case). tho king received no compensating revenue from the new owners. 
and the royal tax collectors ended up with a net loss. After all. 
when the communal property was in village hands. it was often leased 
out. and in this case the leaseholder paid taxes. Even when communal 
land was merely used as collateral for a loan. it served to ease the 
competition between the royal fisc and local needs. Tho problem for 
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tho fisc was compounded by the fact that tho govermnent took no 
cognizance of individual taxpayers. Each village received its taillo 
levy and divided it up among individual peasants. and each village was 
collectively responsible for mooting this obligation. Hence. tho 
royal tax bill and local expenses were inseparably mixed. and tho 
royal govormnent could not simply bypass the village and hold peasants 
individually responsibly for their taille assessments. regardless of 
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what they owed for local expenses. 
To prevent sales of communal lands from eroding the tax base. 
tho royal govormnont stopped in and investigated village finances and 
tho sales of communal lands. It forced some of tho purchasers of 
communal property to return tho land they had bought. and it squeezed 
a bit of money from other buyers. Tho govermnent also placed the 
villages in a position of financial tutelage. Henceforth. tho royal 
intendants supervised village finances. limited communal expenditures 
and repairs. and prohibited the sale or mortgage of communal property. 
The govermnent adhered to this policy not out of solicitude for tho 
peasants. nor out of any desire for a political alliance with them; 
its motive was simply to prevent further hemorrhaging of taxable 
assets. It focused on sales of communal land rather than individual 
peasant property because investigating individual sales was 
undoubtedly too expensive. both in financial and political terms. One 
important consequence this policy. though. was to make the monarchy 
one of the main guarantors of communal property and of communal 
agriculture in general. Its thirst for taxes had pushed it to support 
both communal rights and traditional agricultural practices.36 
By protecting communal property rights. the royal government 
undoubtedly hindered agricultural development. In the southwest of 
France, for example, plans to drain marsh lands ran afoul of village 
claims to marshes, as well as seigniorial rights to salt beds and 
water mills.37 Elsewhere. communal rights encouraged overuse of the 
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land and shackled individual initiative. But these were not the only 
costs which the tax system imposed upon the rural sector. Both 
historians and contemporaries have long claimed that the government's 
fiscal exactions drew money away from peasants and fa:rmers and thereby 
reduced agricultural development. Why fence a plot of land, for 
example. or drain a fen. when the tax collector would simply use the 
improvement as a reason to boost the taille? As Vauban complained in 
1707. 
Things are reduced to such as state • • • that a man who 
could use his own talent and skill in order to ameliorate 
his life and that of his family prefers to stay as he is 
without doing anything. A man who could raise several cows 
or lambs, which could improve his fa:rm or his land, is 
obliged to do without them, lest he be crushed by the !.Ai!!.2 
the following year. as he most certainly would be if he 
earned a little something and it wa~gseen that his harvest 
was a bit more abundant than usual. 
Perhaps even more important were the resources wasted on 
trying to avoid or manipulate taxes. Some peasants in Normandy, for 
instance, paid for fictional second residences in cities so as to 
claim urban tax exemptions; others refrained from erecting new 
buildings which might increase their assessment. Additional time and 
effort was spent on reducing tax assessments, whether it meant 
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influencing the local elu or bribing the village collector. And then 
there were the tax collection costs. which included the resources 
which tax collectors themselves expended in the search for bribes and 
rents. Contemporaries complained that even village tax collectors 
devoted "all of their energy, for days and nights without 
interruption, to the task of seeking out bribes.•39 The result, as one 
historian has noted, was a "perversion" of entrepreneurial talent, a 
perversion visible even at the village level. The tax system diverted 
energy and precious resources into the task of "redistributing the 
nation's wealth rather than into increasing wealth.•40 The tax system 
was thus hardly a costless transfer from the peasantry to the rest of 
society, and its impact was most devastating in agriculture, where 
taxes were heaviest and the inequities and distortions most blatant. 
That the fiscal system retarded French agriculture seems 
undeniable, even though the general causes of economic growth are 
still only dimly understood. Whether taxes bear more responsibility 
than other commonly cited causes of French agricultural stagnation is 
a matter that can only be settled with detailed, quantitative 
research, research that compares the French experience with that of 
other regions. England is one obvious target of comparison, but we 
should also pay attention to regions that followed a different path of 
agricultural development, such as the Low Countries. It may well turn 
out that the obvious difference between France and England~the 
failure to develop large fa:rms using wage labor in France~was less 
important than we think; indeed, some neoclassical economists and some 
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neo-Marxist historians would argue that agricultural development is 
possible with small peasant plots. 41 If this argument is valid, then 
the key to the backwardness of French agriculture may lie in the 
fiscal system, and comparisons not just with England but with 
countries in which peasant agriculture achieved high levels of 
prosperity would be instructive. 
The problem would then be to find what political obstacles 
frustrated the French peasants' initiative, and here the tax system 
undoubtedly played a large role. No state can live without taxes, but 
one might argue that the royal government ought to have designed a tax 
system that would encourage growth rather than redistributive rent 
seeking. The problem, though, is that the payoffs from growth had to 
be shared; those from rent seeking could be appropriated. And they 
were appropriated, by the winners in a contest for spoils. The 
winners were the holders of privileges~the nobles, the office 
holders, and the prosperous bourgeoisie--and stripping away their 
privileges would be unthinkable under the Old Regime. Unfortunately, 
these privileges not only ruined agriculture, they stratified rural 
society and diverted talent away from useful investment. Only when 
the old political system fell did the privileges change, and only then 
did it become possible to remake society anew. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
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